The 'Principal Principle' states, roughly, that one's subjective probability for a proposition should conform to one's beliefs about that proposition's objective chance of coming true. David Lewis has argued (i) that this principle provides the defining role for chance; (ii) that it conflicts with his reductionist thesis of Humean supervenience, and so must be replaced by an amended version that avoids the conflict; hence (iii) that nothing perfectly deserves the name 'chance', although something can come close enough by playing the role picked out by the amended principle. We show that in fact there must be 'chances' that perfectly play what Lewis takes to be the defining role. But this is not the happy conclusion it might seem, since these 'chances' behave too strangely to deserve the name. The lesson is simple: much more than the Principal Principle-more to the point, much more than the connection between chance and credence-informs our understanding of objective chance.
Introduction
David Lewis ([1980] ) argues that a principle which Lewis dubs 'the Principal Principle' constrains rational credence; roughly, this principle states that one's subjective probability for a proposition should conform to one's beliefs about that proposition's objective chance of coming true. But there is a problem, since this principle apparently conflicts with his reductionist thesis of Humean supervenience. Accordingly, in his Lewis adopts an amended version of the principle, which avoids the conflict. Still, the original principle (hereafter: 'OP') maintains pride of place over the new principle (hereafter: 'NP'). For Lewis insists that, despite the need for amendment, 'chance can be defined as that feature of Reality that obeys the old Principle' ([1994], p. 489) . Given the conflict with Humean supervenience, nothing plays that role perfectly; but something can come close enough to deserve the name of 'chance' by playing the role spelled out by NP.
We show here that Lewis's position is untenable. By his lights, there must be 'chances' that play the OP-role perfectly. But this is not the happy conclusion it might seem, since these 'chances' behave too strangely to deserve the name. The lesson is simple: much more than OP-more to the point, much more than the connection between chance and credenceinforms our understanding of objective chance.
We begin with some preliminaries ( §2). In this section, we explain OP, the conflict with Humean supervenience (and, as we will explain, with much weaker reductionist claims), and the resolution of the conflict via NP. Then, in §3, we show how the trick that yields NP can also be used to construct 'chances' that play the OP-role perfectly, with no threat of conflict with Humean supervenience. In §4 we explain why this consequence is so unwelcome for Lewis: on the one hand, these 'chances' display behavior so odd that no one should be forced, on philosophical grounds, to accept that they are genuine chances; on the other hand, Lewis's insistence on the conceptual centrality of OP does force him to accept this. Finally, §5 sketches what we think is a common-sense way out: grant that much more than its connection with rational credence constrains our concept of chance.
Preliminaries
Hereafter, 'C' will represent some arbitrary reasonable initial credence function-some way that ideally rational opinion could be, prior to the incorporation of any evidence. We assume that C is a probability distribution (over the space of possible worlds), and define conditional credence by the usual ratio:
For each world w and time t, let P tw be the probability distribution that describes the objective chances for world w at time t (the 't-chances'). Let T w be the chance-theory for w: T w describes how, at w, chances depend on history. If H tw is the proposition which completely characterizes w's history up to time t, that means that the conjunction H tw T w completely specifies the t-chances at w (i.e., for every proposition A for which a chance is defined, P tw (A) ¼ x iff H tw T w implies that the t-chance of A is x). More generally, for any history H t compatible with T w , the conjunction H t T w determines what the chances would have been, had history been as described by H t . We will assume that the past is not chancy: for all w and t, P tw (H tw ) ¼ 1.
Hereafter, P will always denote a chance function, T a chance-theory, and H a complete history up to some time; subscripts for times and worlds will be suppressed unless clarity demands otherwise.
One philosophical thesis about chance is that it supervenes on total history: no two worlds differ in their chance-theories without differing somehow in their total histories of non-modal fact. 1 We will label this thesis reductionism about chance.
Lewis is a reductionist about chance. And that is because he is a reductionist about pretty much everything: all truths about a world supervene on its total history of non-modal fact.
2 That is one part of his metaphysical thesis of Humean supervenience. The other part concerns the nature of these non-modal facts: they are entirely determined by the geometrical structure of the world's spacetime, together with the pattern of instantiation of perfectly natural properties at the spacetime points therein. But as we will see, all that matters is the reductionism about chance. It will not matter whether reductionism about other sorts of truths holds, nor whether the supervenience base has the character that Lewis claims it does.
Undermining futures and the New Principle
Here is the original Principle:
OP: Let A be any proposition, and let X be the proposition that the chance, at time t, of A is x. Then for any rational credence function C and proposition E, the following holds, if E is admissible at time t and is compatible 3 with X: C(AjEX) ¼ x.
According to Lewis ([1980] , p. 92), 'Admissible propositions are the sort of information whose impact on credence about outcomes comes entirely by way of credence about the chances of those outcomes.' Prime candidates, it would seem, are historical propositions and chance-theories; if so, we have as a special case:
On What We Know About Chance 173 Now comes trouble for the reductionist about chance. For he says that a world's total history determines its chance-theory. So given a world with initial history H and chance-theory T, there will be possible futures that would, together with H, determine a chance-theory different from T (unless, implausibly, H alone determines T). Let F describe such a future course of events, and suppose that P(F) 6 ¼ 0. Since the conjunction HF contradicts T,
Need a reductionist worry about such 'undermining futures', as Thau ([1994] ) aptly labels them? Yes. A simple example will help show why, and will also prove useful in the discussion to come.
We will consider a total history amenable to a simple frequentist treatment. Suppose that in world w there is just one type of chancy process, each instance of which has two possible outcomes. Call this process a 'coin toss'. Suppose that each time this process occurs, the physical conditions of its occurrence are exactly the same. Suppose further that at some initial time t, the laws and history up to t determine that exactly one million coin tosses will take place. And finally, suppose that it turns out that exactly one-half land 'heads'. Then a simple reductionist recipe for how total history determines chances will deliver a chance-theory T for w according to which (i) the tosses are treated as independent and identically distributed (since the physical conditions of each toss are the same); and (ii) the single-case chance for 'heads' is simply the overall frequency of 'heads'-namely, 1 2
. But now we have our undermining futures: for example, a total history in which threefourths of the outcomes are heads would certainly determine a different chance-theory (by determining a single-case chance equal to 3 4 ), but at t, the chance that such a history obtains is greater than zero. Observe that the problem has nothing to do with Humean supervenience per se: it seems that any reductionist about chance will face it.
To see how to fix the problem, first restate it: plugging T itself in for A, OP gives P(T) ¼ 1-in other words, OP requires that the chance-theory can itself never have any chance of being false. But, for a typical total history, reductionism about chance will inevitably-and, let's face it, quite counterintuitively-say otherwise. In our example, the t-chance of T is actually quite small-just the chance that exactly half the one million tosses land heads, or about 0.0008. As we have seen, OP turns this counterintuitive consequence of reductionism into an outright contradiction. To handle the problem, we need a way of amending OP so that C(TjHT) comes out equal to 1 (as it must), and not equal to P(T). A simple solution-the one built into the 'New Principle'-is to conditionalize the chances on T itself, thus: NP: CðAjHTÞ ¼ PðAjHTÞ Under the assumption that P(H) ¼ 1, this becomes C(AjHT) ¼ P(AjT).
Both Lewis ([1994] ) and Hall ([1994] ) show how NP completely avoids the problem of undermining futures, and argue that in practice, it deviates little from OP. (Hall, in addition, offers independent reasons for preferring NP to OP.) Consider our example, letting T be the chance-theory, H history up to the initial time t, and A the proposition that 5 of the first 10 tosses land heads: OP says that C(AjHT) % 0.246094, while NP says that C(AjHT) % 0.246095.
The Old Principle rescued?
A non-reductionist about chance need not choose between OP and NP, since she can say that P(T) is always 1-in which case NP and OP are equivalent. Not so for the reductionist, who, it seems, should settle on NP.
But even though he is a reductionist, matters are otherwise for Lewis. Despite revising the Principal Principle, Lewis says that the meaning of chance assertions is still (more or less) given by OP. Because of undermining, there is nothing that perfectly plays the OP-role, but that is okay: there is still something that comes awfully close to playing that role, and so still deserves the name of 'chance'. As Lewis ([1994] , p. 489) puts it, A feature of Reality deserves the name of chance to the extent that it occupies the definitive role of chance; and occupying the role means obeying the old Principle, applied as if information about present chances, and the complete theory of chance, were perfectly admissible. Because of undermining, nothing perfectly occupies the role, so nothing perfectly deserves the name. But near enough is good enough. If nature is kind to us, the chances ascribed by the probabilistic laws of the best system will obey the old Principle to a very good approximation in commonplace applications. They will thereby occupy the chance-role well enough to deserve the name. To deny that they are really chances would be just silly.
But it could not be silly, by Lewis's lights, if some other 'feature of Reality' occupied the chance-role perfectly. We claim that if NP is correct, then there must be just such a feature.
Making the indices explicit, NP says: C(AjH tw T w ) ¼ P tw (AjT w ). According to Lewis's version of reductionism, there should be a Humean feature of reality which makes it the case that the P tw (-) has the values it does. For according to Lewis, there is a Humean feature that satisfies OP near enough-and 'near enough is good enough'. But in that case, there is likewise a Humean feature of reality which makes it the case that the P tw (-j T w ) has the values it does. More exactly, for any proposition A there is a Humean feature of reality that makes it the case that P tw (AjT w ) has the value it does. Then since the new Principle is correct, it follows that this feature obeys the old Principle perfectly. So the chance of A at time t in world w must equal the value this feature yields for P tw (AjT w ).
But that can't be right! The chance of A at time t in world w is P tw (A) and not P tw (AjT w ). For P tw (A) is just the notation we use as shorthand for the chance of A at time t in world w. Moreover we know, because of undermining, that the value of P tw (A) is not in general equal to the value of P tw (AjT w ). So it cannot be that the chance of A at time t in world w equals P tw (AjT w ). So we seem to have arrived at a contradiction.
There is, technically speaking, a way out of this dilemma-but as will shortly become clear, it really just helps show how acute the problem is. We can use the trick of conditionalizing the chances on the chance-theory itself to come up with an alternative Humean 'recipe' for picking out the chance function-one which is guaranteed to yield a chance-theory that gives itself no chance of being false. Here's how:
Begin with a reductionist philosopher (call him 'L'), who proposes a recipe (the 'L-recipe') for assigning to each world w a chance-theory T w . Suppose that these theories admit undermining, but are otherwise acceptable; in particular they perfectly obey the new Principle. Now we'll describe the views of a different reductionist philosopher L*; he proposes a different recipe (the 'L*-recipe'), which is parasitic in a certain way on the Lrecipe, as follows:
Given a world w that has, according to the L-recipe, chance-theory T w , we know that the conjunction of T w with any initial history H compatible with it picks out a chance-function P(-). The L*-recipe yields a different chancetheory T Ã w for w, one that describes a different pattern of dependence of chance on history. Specifically, T Ã w picks out, in conjunction with H, the chance-function P*(-) ¼ P(-j T w ). Note that L and L* need not disagree in their ultimate metaphysical commitments (they might both believe in Humean supervenience, for example), nor even in what the actual world is like; it is rather that they disagree as to which probability distributions deserve to be called 'chances'. So their chance-theories for a given world will typically differ, since-thanks to undermining-they will specify different probability distributions as being the chances. Now, observe that whenever the L-recipe says that two worlds have the same chance-theory, the L*-recipe likewise says they have the same chancetheory (though the converse need not hold). So T w entails T Ã w . That is, the proposition that L identifies as the chance-theory for w entails the proposition that L* identifies as the chance-theory for w. And observe that L*'s chance-functions P Ã tw (-) for w will be defined as P Ã tw (-) ¼ P tw (-j T w ). Putting these together, we have the consequence that P Ã tw (T Ã w ) ¼ 1. So L*'s chance-theories cannot possibly be undermined-because, for short, these theories result from L's chance-theories by 'conditionalizing out' any possibility of undermining. Now here is the punch line: if by Lewis's lights the L-recipe is acceptable, then the L*-recipe must be preferable to it-which is just to say that the L-recipe can't be acceptable (since to say it is acceptable is to say, at least, that there is no preferable alternative).
To see this, suppose that the L-recipe is acceptable. Then the chancetheories it delivers must be able to play the role defined by NP. But in that case, the chance-theories delivered by the L*-recipe play the role defined by OP perfectly; that is, every instance of CðAjHT*Þ ¼ P*ðAÞ will be true-even according to L. For while L will not agree that T* is properly characterized as a chance-theory, he will agree that it is equivalent to a disjunction of propositions T 1 , T 2 , . . . which, by his lights, are properly characterized as chance-theories. And for an arbitrary such disjunct T i , L will assert the instance of NP:
where P i is the chance-function picked out by the conjunction HT i . Moreover, given the way the L*-recipe identified T*, L must agree that for any two disjuncts T i and T j , P i (AjT i ) ¼ P j (AjT j ) ¼ P*(A). Then it follows at once from the probability calculus that C(AjHT*) ¼ P*(A). So the chances delivered by the L*-recipe play the Principal Principle role exactly; and that means, by Lewis's lights, that they are the chances.
Why not take this result to be a victory? Undermining is no threat-for if the reductionist can come up with any acceptable recipe, he can come up with one that yields non-underminable chances. So perhaps Lewis was simply wrong to see any trouble for his doctrine of Humean supervenience in the first place. OP stands in no need of amendment after all.
The New Bug
But matters are not so happy, for in fact what we have shown is that Lewis is forced into a wholly implausible view about what the chances are like. A bit of reflection shows that the chances delivered by a recipe like L*'s are (almost certainly) bizarre. In particular, a plausible reductionist recipe ought to-or at least ought to be allowed to-assign the same single-case chances to outcomes of physically identical experimental setups; that constraint was explicit in our simple frequentist treatment of the coin toss. But we do not see how L*'s chances could in general have this feature.
To see why, return to our coin-toss example. Applying L*'s trick, we get a different chance-theory T* for w. Whereas T said that the tosses were independent, and that each had chance 1 2 of landing heads, T* says that it is, at the initial time t, certain that exactly half of the one million tosses will land heads, although every possible sequence compatible with this constraint is equally likely.
Here is a way to make the difference between these two chance-theories vivid. It is as if, at t, we have before us an urn with a million marbles in it, half labeled 'heads' and half labeled 'tails'. We are going to make one million random draws from this urn. Then T says we will make these draws with replacement, whereas T* says we will make them without replacement. If T* is right, then the single-case chance of heads will vary from draw to draw: it will start out at 0.5, and then become either 0.5000005 or 0.4999995 . . . and will, on the last draw, be either 0 or 1. But real chances don't vary in this way-or if they do, it's not up to the philosopher to say so. Any philosophical position which says that, in an example such as ours, the chances must vary in this way is unacceptable. But that is exactly the sort of position Lewis occupies.
Conclusion
Reductionism about chance was always a risky proposition, simply because it is, intuitively, quite plausible that different chance distributions could give rise to exactly the same total history of non-modal facts. But if you are going to be a reductionist about chance, then there are certain rules you had better adhere to. In particular, your recipe for how total history determines chances should be sensitive to basic symmetries of time and space-so that if, for example, two processes going on in different regions of spacetime are exactly alike, your recipe assigns to their outcomes the same single-case chances. (It is not that a non-reductionist will have no place for such a constraint: it is just that she will likely not view it as a substantive metaphysical thesis about chance, but as a substantive methodological thesis about how we should, in doing science, theorize about chance.) And the substantial intuitive force of this constraint shows that Lewis is misguided when he writes of OP that 'this principle seems to me to capture all we know about chance' ([1980] , p. 86). It couldn't capture all we know about chance, since it cannot explain why chances must (according to the reductionist) reflect physical symmetries, or ought rationally to be thought to do so (according to the non-reductionist).
It seems to us, therefore, that Lewis should have abandoned his insistence that chance is implicitly defined as that which obeys the original Principal Principle. What else must be abandoned along with this is a good question.
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